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Chapter 11
Unifying Pension Schemes in Japan: Toward
a Single Scheme for Both Civil Servants and
Private Employees
Junichi Sakamoto

Countries may be classified into two groups according to whether civil
servants are covered by the same social security pension scheme as the one
covering private employees, or whether special schemes apply to government workers, in which case they are generally not covered by the social
security pension scheme that applies to private employees. The United
Kingdom and Sweden represent the former case, where all employees are
included in a single social security pension. There, civil servants are also
provided with occupational plans. In the latter group, we have Germany
(Maurer, Mitchell, and Rogalla 2009) and France; here civil servants are not
covered by the social security pension schemes as are private employees. US
federal government employees are in a transitional phase, where initially
they had their own plan but new entrants after 1983 are covered by the
national Social Security system; for this new group, the civil service pension
represents their occupational pension on the national Social Security base.
Until the middle of the 1980s, Japan used to belong to the latter group.
There were special schemes for national government and local government employees, and they were not in the national system covering private
employees called the Employees’ Pension Insurance (EPI) system. Benefit
design, benefit levels, and contribution rates were totally different from
each other. This structure began to change in 1984 when the government
published a Cabinet Decision to unify all the occupation-specific compulsory programs and to finish the unification by 1995. While this plan was not
realized by 1995, some of the schemes were merged with the EPI scheme
rendering the coverage structure somewhat simpler. Benefit design and
benefit levels also converged to a considerable extent.
Nevertheless, at present there still remain three occupation-specific
schemes for employees other than the EPI scheme (see Figure 11-1).1
Contribution levels still differ from one another, though benefit provisions
are considerably equalized.2 In 2007, the government once again submitted
a bill to unify the remaining schemes by extending coverage of the EPI
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Occupational addition

Employees' Pension
Insurance (EPI) Scheme
(34 million)

The 1st Category
of the Insured:
the self-employed,
farmers,
the unemployed, etc.
(21 million)

The 3rd Category
of the Insured:
Dependent spouses
of employees
(11 million)

Mutual Aid
Association
For
Government
Employees
(MAAGE)
(1 million)

Mutual Aid
Association
for Local
Government
Employees
(MAALGE)
(3 million)

Mutual Aid
Association
for Private
School
Employees
(MAAPSE)
(0.5 million)

the 2nd Category of the Insured:
employees
(38 million)

National Pension (NP) Scheme (70 million)

Figure 11-1 Japan’s current social security pension schemes. Note: The figures in
parentheses are the number of the insured by each scheme as of the end of
March 2007. Source: Summary of the social security pension schemes in Japan by
the Actuarial Subcommittee of the Social Security Council published on March 19,
2008 (Government of Japan 2008).

scheme to all workers including national and local government employees.
At present, the ultimate shape of the fully merged system can only be
outlined, as we shall show in the following text.
In what follows, we first describe how the different Japanese social security pension schemes cover the nation.3 We then analyze reasons why the
move to unify social security pension schemes began in 1984, with particular reference to the Mutual Aid Association (MAA) for Japan Railway Company Employees. Next we highlight aspects of the bill submitted to the Diet
in 2007, along with the forces compelling the government to submit the bill
and how issues of merger are addressed. We mention the complementary
retirement benefit provisions for national and local government employees
after the unification. Finally we summarize the process of unification and
draw some lessons from the process, as well as offer thoughts about the
future path of unification.

Evolution of the Japanese government employee
pension scheme
After the Meiji restoration in 1868, the government that took over the Tokugawa Shogunate regime tried to construct an industrial country. It sought
to consolidate the government by establishing a personnel system that
would recruit competent persons for various administrative organs and by
organizing the armed forces. It was in this context that the superannuation
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systems for civil servants and members of the armed forces were introduced. The government introduced a superannuation system for the Navy
in 1875 and then for the Army in 1876. It also introduced a superannuation
system for civil servants in 1884. It should be noted here that government
employees at that time were classified into two groups: civil servants and
public employees.4 The superannuation system covered only the civil servants and members of the armed forces, but not for public employees more
generally.
These superannuation systems were based on the concept that civil
servants were people whose lives were ‘bought’ by the nation.5 In other
words, they were required to work for the government for life, reflecting
the German concept of lifetime commitment (Kuhlman and Röber 2004).
At the same time, however, this was a concept that the general public at
that time could easily accept because of the tradition under the Tokugawa
Shogunate regime whereby lords required lifetime loyalty of their servants
and gave them a lifetime salary in return. In this sense, the superannuation
was more like a salary than a retirement plan. It was financed in principle
by the general revenue with civil servants contributing 2 percent of their
salary as a token of appreciation. The various superannuation systems were
unified into a single system in 1923.
By contrast, public employees were covered by mutual aid associations
introduced organization by organization. Once a government organization
introduced its mutual aid association, its public employees were compulsorily covered and they paid contributions. The first mutual aid association
was introduced in 1905 for public employees of the Yawata Iron Manufacturing Public Corporation. It began by providing compensation for
workplace injuries but later added medical insurance and pension benefits for old-age, disability, and survivorship. Subsequently, the mutual aid
associations for employees of other organizations like the Imperial Railway
Agency were introduced.6 These mutual aid associations were introduced
by the government organizations in charge of day-to-day operations. By
contrast, public employees of government planning offices (not in charge
of day-to-day operations) were without pensions until 1949.
After World War II, the Japanese civil service system was reformed, and
in 1947 the distinction between civil servants and public employees was
abolished. Nevertheless the superannuation system for the people deemed
to be civil servants in the old system was maintained, though the mutual
aid association system was reformed and codified in 1949 as the Government Employees’ Mutual Aid Association Act. This was done to extend the
coverage to the people deemed to be public employees of the government
branches for planning who were not in charge of day-to-day operations.
The new mutual aid association system also equalized benefit provisions
and qualifying conditions irrespective of which government organization
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or branch one belonged to.7 It did not, however, cover the people deemed
to be civil servants in the old system.8
Extending coverage of the mutual aid association system to those deemed
to be civil servants under the old system was spurred in 1949, when the
Imperial Railway Agency was separated from the Ministry of Transportation
and became a public enterprise called Japan National Railway Company
(JNR). New entrants to the JNR were covered by the mutual aid association
system for government employees even if they were posted in positions that
civil servants used to occupy. Existing employees, who had joined the JNR
before it was made a public enterprise and were deemed to be civil servants, were still covered by the old superannuation system. This provoked
feelings of inequality among JNR employees and gave rise to a movement
to introduce a new mutual aid association for the JNR employees. In 1956,
the Public Enterprise Employees’ Mutual Aid Association Act was enacted
which separated this group from the mutual aid association for government
employees. Their benefit provisions were more generous than that of the
mutual aid association for government employees.
Two other government organizations were also made into public enterprises around the same time: the Salt and Tobacco Monopoly Enterprise (in
1949), and the Nippon Telegraph and Telecommunications Enterprise (in
1952); their employees then were covered by the Public Enterprise Employees’ Mutual Aid Association Act from 1956. It should be noted, however,
that contribution rates were set for each enterprise. In what follows, we
denote these mutual aid associations of the JNR, the Salt and Tobacco
Monopoly Enterprise, and the Nippon Telegraph and Telecommunications
Enterprise by the acronyms MAA for JR Employees, the MAA for JT Employees and the MAA for NTT Employees.9
Stimulated by the movement in the public enterprises, demand for equal
pension treatment of government employees grew until in 1959, mutual
aid association coverage was extended to those deemed to be civil servants
under the old system. At this point, the traditional superannuation system
was abolished and Japan departed from the concept that the civil servants
were those whose lives were ‘bought’ by the government. The government
decided to unify the system in the form of mutual aid associations believing
that the concept of lifetime employment was no longer acceptable to the
nation. Further, mutual aid associations had been satisfactorily managed up
to then so it was easy to obtain political support for these entities. It was also
judged that the reserve fund to be formed under the mutual aid association
system might be more conducive to government employee welfare than
when the government directly managed and controlled the money. Last,
the Ministry of Finance feared that rising pension costs would have to be
paid from the general budget, so establishing a dedicated scheme for these
employees seemed sensible at the time.
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Several insurers or financial units developed under the new system.
Each of the government departments in charge of day-to-day operations
(e.g., the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications, the Forestry Agency,
etc.) formed its own financial unit and decided contribution rates independently. The rest of the government employees were in the financial
unit administered by the Federation of National Public Service Personnel
Mutual Aid Associations (FMAA). Subsequently these financial units were
unified under a single unit administered by the FMAA in 1984.
The new mutual aid association system provided for retirement, disability, and survivor benefits.10 The retirement benefit formula was based
on the three-year average of the basic salary prior to retirement, and 40
percent of this amount was provided for 20 years of service. One additional year of service increased the percentage by 1.5 percentage points.
So after 40 years the benefit was 70 percent of the three-year average
basic salary prior to retirement. The contribution rate of the financial unit
administered by the FMAA was set at 8.8 percent for the part financed by
contributions, with a government subsidy financing the remaining part.
The contribution rate was decided based on the static level contribution
method.11 It should be noted that the costs of paying benefits accrued
prior to October 1959, called past service costs, were to be borne solely by
the government.12 The contributions shared by the government employees
and the government as employer were, therefore, for the benefits corresponding to the service period after October 1959.13
Although the government employee pension scheme departed from
the superannuation system, the mutual aid association system itself had
the nature of an occupational pension. These schemes were not only for
securing income after retirement, but also for compensating the loss of
opportunity to increase savings caused by the restrictions imposed on government employees.14 One consequence of this occupational nature was
that benefits were indexed in line with the rise in government employees’
salaries.15
Arrangements similar to the past service cost of the mutual aid association for government employees were introduced in the case of the public
enterprises. The cost of paying prior service benefits (prior to 1956) is
borne by the public enterprises, and contributions paid by the public enterprise employees were for benefits corresponding to service after July 1956.

The evolution of local government
employee pensions
Pension schemes for local government employees followed a rather complicated process of evolution. Before the Local Government Employee Act was
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enacted in 1950, these workers also used to be classified into civil servants
and public employees. At the prefectural level, civil servants were further
subclassified into two groups: one was the group of civil servants deemed to
be ‘equal’ to central government civil servants and it also included teachers
of schools established by local governments and policemen. This group was
covered by the superannuation system. The other group included locally
recruited civil servants, and these were usually covered by schemes similar
to but distinct from the superannuation system. Since such schemes were
gradually introduced, their dates of inception varied from prefecture to
prefecture.
Employees at the prefectural level were initially not covered by any
pension scheme, until 1949 when the mutual aid association system for
government employees was extended to cover them. At the same time
policemen and teachers came to be covered by the mutual aid association
system for government employees. This policy was based on the idea that
the employees of prefectural governments were deemed to belong to the
Ministry of the Interior.
At the municipal level, civil servants were covered by superannuation
systems stipulated in local bylaws and their inception dates varied from
municipality to municipality. Although some of them were covered by the
EPI scheme, municipal public employees were not, in principle, covered
by any scheme until 1955 when the Municipal Employees’ Mutual Aid
Association Act was enacted.
Finally in 1962, following the establishment of the new Government
Employees’ Mutual Aid Association Act of 1959, the Local Government
Employees’ Mutual Aid Association Act was enacted. This covered all the
prefectural and municipal government employees by the mutual aid association for local government employees; benefits were the same as those
of the mutual aid association for government employees. As was true for
the mutual aid association for government employees, prior service cost
for benefits prior to 1962 had to be borne by local governments.16

Evolution of the modern Japanese social security
pension scheme
Private sector employees had no national pension system until 1940; while
some firms provided occupational pensions, the number was very small.
During the 1930s, as war loomed, the importance of maritime transportation rapidly increased. Nevertheless, seamen’s jobs were strenuous and they
had to retire quite young, and few wanted to be seamen. Furthermore, if a
vessel carrying soldiers and arms was sunk in an attack, seamen’s survivors
were not compensated, while those of the members of the armed forces

20:23

978–0–19–957334–9

Mitchell-Main-drv

Mitchell

(Typeset by SPi, Chennai)

170 of 343

July 21, 2009

170 Junichi Sakamoto

were compensated. In the face of seamen’s complaints, the government
in 1940 introduced Seamen’s Insurance to make the occupation more
attractive and retain the necessary number of seamen. At this time, the
Seamen’s Insurance provided not only pension benefits but also medical
insurance, and the pensionable age for an old-age benefit was age 50.
While seamen received this special treatment, there was no general pension yet available for private employees in general. In 1922, responding to
labor disputes, the government studied Bismark’s German social insurance
system and introduced a health insurance system. In 1942, the government
then introduced the EPI scheme. At first it covered only male blue-collar
workers employed by enterprises with 10 or more employees; subsequently,
it extended the coverage to male and female employees including whitecollar employees (in 1944). Also industrial enterprises were at first limited
to those in the manufacturing and mining sectors, but in 1954 the plan was
extended to all industries except for the service sector. The lower size limit
of covered enterprises was also cut to 5 from 10 (in 1954) and then to one
for legal entities in 1985.
After World War II ended in 1945, Japan suffered from economic turmoil: prices skyrocketed and many aspects of government were forced to
change drastically. One of these changes included a reform in the civil
service system, erasing the distinction between civil servants and public
employees. As a natural consequence, the superannuation system and the
mutual aid association system were unified into the single new mutual aid
association system.
In the private sector, too, reform discussions broke out inasmuch as
hyperinflation had seriously eroded benefit levels. In 1954, coverage of the
EPI scheme was extended to employees of most enterprises.17 The benefit
formula was also changed from the one comprising of only an earningsrelated part to one that includes both a flat-rate portion and an earningsrelated portion. Nevertheless, efforts to boost benefit levels were rejected
by employers, whereupon three occupational groups decided to withdraw
from (or not participate in) extended coverage of the EPI scheme. The
first group involved private schools which established their own mutual aid
association, ignoring the effort to extend EPI coverage to private educational organizations.18 The second group included public employees of
municipalities, some of whom had been covered by EPI; however they
decided to withdraw from it and to establish their own mutual aid association in 1955. Later, in 1962, when the new mutual aid association system
for local government employees was established, this one was absorbed
by the new system. The third group comprised employees of agricultural
cooperatives and fishery cooperatives; they too had been covered by EPI
previously. Arguing that their jobs were like those of the local government
employees, they claimed independence of the EPI scheme and established
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their own system. Thus, the Mutual Aid Association for Agricultural, Fishery
and Forestry Cooperative Employees was established in 1959.19
In the late 1950s, as the economy recovered, there was much discussion
about how to extend the health insurance program to the whole nation,
so all could receive medical services. This discussion, spurred by demands
from farmers and the self-employed to be included in social security pension schemes, led the government to begin thinking about covering the
whole nation with a social security pension. While there was debate over
including everyone in the EPI if they were not already in a mutual aid
association or EPI, it was believed impossible because of the difficulty of
measuring income for the self-employed and farmers.
Eventually a new scheme called the National Pension (NP) scheme was
introduced in 1961, which covered self-employed, farmers, non-employed
people, and employees of small enterprises with fewer than five employees.
Both the benefits and the contributions under this system were flat rate;
those with little or no income were exempted from paying contributions.
Though initially it covered only the self-employed, farmers, etc, it was
nevertheless the largest scheme at that time, including 20 million people
in 1965, while the EPI scheme covered 18.7 million people.

Pension jealousy and long-term financial problems
Altogether then, in the 1960s there were 10 separate social security pension
schemes including mutual aid associations. In the 1960s, Japan experienced
economic growth and the benefit level of the EPI scheme and the NP
scheme were greatly improved after 1965. But in the 1970s, problems in
this complex structure gradually became conspicuous.
One reason had to do with the great difference of benefit provisions
between the EPI scheme and the MAA schemes. Introduction of an automatic indexation provision of the EPI scheme in 1973 caused great public
expectation for the EPI scheme and interest in comparing the benefit
provisions with those provided by the MAA schemes.20 It eventually led
to people’s awareness of the fact that there were disparities between the
EPI and the MAA schemes. For example, the pensionable age for the EPI
system was raised to 60 after the 1954 reform, while it remained age 55
for the MAA schemes. In addition, the EPI benefit was proportionate to
the worker’s career indexed average salary plus a flat-rate portion, while
the MAA benefit was, generally speaking, proportional to final salary. In
addition, the MAA benefit was much higher than under the EPI scheme,
partly due to the fact that the average length of the covered period was
also much longer in the case of the MAA schemes than for the EPI
scheme.
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In any case, demands grew to rectify the disparities, and pension jealousy
or pension tension peaked in the mid-1970s. One reaction was to raise the
MAA pensionable age to 60 with a transitional provision. It also began to
be known that the financial prospects of some MAA schemes were gloomy
and appeared not to be sustainable due to changes in industrial structure
or employment structure. The particular ones mentioned were the NP
scheme, the Seamen’s Insurance, and the MAA for JR Employees.21
These problems were partly the result of urbanization as industrialization
advanced, a process that began in Japan long before World War II but
exacerbated in the 1960s and 1970s. This demographic shift resulted in a
dire actuarial projection for the NP system in 1980 that indicated a decline
in active participants in the near future and unsustainable contribution
rates. The Seamen’s Insurance system actually experienced declines in the
numbers of active participants after 1970, reflecting the fact that advances
in shipbuilding technology greatly reduced the number of sailors necessary
to operate a ship. Further, Japan’s maritime transportation industry had
lost its international competitiveness because of its high cost, producing
considerable redundancies. And restrictions imposed on economic activities outside the 200 sea mile zone further contributed to the pension
scheme’s downward spiral, requiring higher contribution rates almost every
year after 1973.
Similarly the MAA for JR employees also began to experience changes in
industrial structure during the 1970s. During this time, motorways came
to connect many key Japanese cities, and roads were also improved for
trucking; all of this produced redundancies in the JR Company. Their
pension system fell into grave financial problems and after receiving help
from other schemes in the 1980s, they were finally absorbed into the EPI
scheme in 1997.

Pension reform in the 1980s
To cope with pension system financial problems caused by changes in
industrial and employment structure, and to respond to the pension jealousy discussion, a massive reform in pensions was carried out in 1985. A first
element of the reform involved the extension of NP system coverage to the
whole nation; further, the NP scheme was restructured to provide flat-rate
basic pensions, while schemes for employees including the EPI scheme and
the MAA schemes were rearranged to provide only an earnings-related benefit. In the process, the government devised a ‘Basic Pension Sub-account’
in the National Pension Special Account, and the financing framework
for basic pension benefits was established (see Figure 11-2).22 As a result,
the current NP scheme was born in the 1985 reform. This framework
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(Contributions & subsidy)
(Transfer of designated amount of money)
Employees
Employers

The EPI scheme

Government

National Pension Special Account

Employees
Employers
Government

Self-employed, etc.
MAA for government
employees

Local governments
Employees
Employers

Government
(Contributions & subsidy)

(Transfer of designated amount of money)

Employees
Employers

National pension
sub-account

MAA for local
government employees
MAA for private
school employees

Basic pension
sub-account
(Basic pension benefits)

Government
Basic pension
beneficiaries

Figure 11-2 Financing basic pension benefits in Japan. Source: 2004 Actuarial
Report of the EPI scheme and the NP scheme by the Ministry of Health, Labour
and Welfare (Government of Japan 2005).

is no longer affected by changes in industrial structure because even if
farmers do become employees, they will continue to support basic pension
beneficiaries as contributors to the Basic Pension Sub-account of the NP
Special Account.
The second major element of the 1985 reform was a change in MAA
benefit formulas, where the approach moved away from a final salary formula toward a career average salary formula. It should be noted, however,
that an amount equal to 20 percent23 of the amount calculated by the new
formula was added to the basic part of the MAA benefit; this was called the
‘occupational addition.’ This was added to MAA benefits because national
government and local government employees were, from time to time, prohibited from saving on their own due to the code of conduct imposed upon
them as public servants. The occupational addition was to compensate for
such loss of opportunities. In any event, the occupational addition has been
one of the main sources of pension jealousy, and proposed legislation has
stipulated that the occupational addition be abolished.
A third element of the 1985 reform required the merger of the Seamen’s
Insurance and the EPI scheme.24 As we have seen, the Seamen’s Insurance scheme had suffered from a decline in active participants and faced
worsening conditions. Fortunately, benefit provisions under the Seamen’s
Insurance plan were the same as those for mineworkers in the EPI scheme,
so it was rather easy to merge it with the EPI scheme. A reserve fund
corresponding to an amount that would have been accumulated to the
same degree as the mine workers would have accumulated in the EPI
scheme was transferred to the EPI scheme.
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As a result, the 1985 reform partially solved many problems facing the
NP and Seamen’s Insurance schemes. The financial problems faced by the
MAA for JR Employees were, however, left unsolved though the financial
conditions were relieved to a certain extent by the introduction of the basic
pension benefits. The problems with the MAA for JR Employees were grave
because of the steep decrease of active participants. The 1985 reform also
addressed the pension jealousy discussion, so by and large, the disparities
were minimized. Nevertheless, differences including the occupational addition and other benefit provisions or contribution rates remain; these are
the subject of current reform bills.
In the mid-1980s, with the Cabinet Decision of 1984, the Japanese government declared that the unification of social security pension schemes
should be completed by 1995. Although full unification has not yet been
completed, the process has been pursued and legislation was submitted to
the Diet in 2007 to unify all social security pension schemes for employees.
In the meantime, several schemes have been absorbed by the EPI. Several
driving forces have been in play. One is pension jealousy, but another is
the fact that some schemes actually faced insolvency. After this Cabinet
Decision of 1984, all benefit reforms made in the EPI scheme were also
reflected in the MAAs: for example, in 1994, the benefit indexation basis
was changed from gross salary to disposable income, and this change was
reflected in both the EPI and the MAAs. In 2000, the EPI old-age pensionable age was raised to 65 from 60, and so too in the MAAs. In 2004,
the EPI introduced a modified indexation, and the MAAs also adopted the
same index. This situation thus seems similar to that in Germany after 1992,
where civil servant pensions have followed the reforms of the social security
pension scheme (Börsch-Supan and Wilke 2003).
The MAA for JR Employees. As we have seen earlier, the MAA for JR
Employees faced a steep decrease in active participants in the 1980s due
to the shift of transportation on land from railway to lorry. This had a
great impact on the financial basis of the MAA scheme and forced it to
raise its contribution rates every year, from 10.24 percent in 1980 to 16.99
percent in 1984. Yet further contribution rates increases were in the offing,
leading the government to require financial help from the MAA schemes
for Government Employees, JT Employees, and NTT Employees beginning
in 1984. Nevertheless this financial help did not solve the problems, so in
1990 the government required all employee schemes including the EPI
scheme to help out the MAA for JR Employees. As this measure would
stabilize the financial problem for the time being, the government set up
in 199425 a group consisting of scholars and representatives from the social
security pension schemes to work out measures to merge the MAA for JR
Employees with the EPI scheme with the ultimate goal being the unification
of the social security pension schemes for employees.
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As of 1990, when the financial transfers began from all the schemes to
the MAA for JR Employees, it turned out that the MAA for JT Employees
was also in financial difficulties. Here the number of active participants
fell from 38,000 in 1980 to 25,000 in 1990, mainly due to the invention of
automatic tobacco-rolling machines which led to labor redundancies. As a
consequence, the MAA for JT Employees was also provided with financial
help by the 1990 framework.
In its 1995 report the working group suggested that the three MAA
schemes for JR, JT, and NTT Employees should be merged with the EPI
scheme as of 1997, and the remaining schemes for employees should also
be gradually unified as they matured in the early years of the twenty-first
century. One might ask why the MAA for NTT Employees was asked to
merge with the EPI scheme, as this system was not in financial difficulty
at that time. Nevertheless, the NTT Company had been privatized in 1985
and so the working group suggested that it should also be merged with
the EPI scheme. (Incidentally, the JR Company was privatized in 1987 and
the JT Company in 1985.) Following this report, a bill was passed in 1996
to merge the three MAA schemes with the EPI scheme and the merger
took place in 1997. Thus the financial problems faced by the MAA for JR
Employees were solved,26 lagging behind the NP scheme and the Seamen’s
Insurance for more than a decade.
The Financial Framework for the Merger. When the working group
decided to merge the three MAA schemes for JR, JT, and NTT Employees
with the EPI scheme, they proposed a financial framework that would avoid
imposing a new burden solely on the EPI scheme and distribute it among
the remaining schemes for employees. Without such a framework, all of
the financial imbalance would have gone for compensation solely by the
EPI scheme. The working group suggested that it should be compensated
for by all the remaining schemes for employees. Three principles formed
the basis of the proposal:
(i) Benefits corresponding to the period after the merger would be
supported by all active participants of the EPI scheme.
(ii) The three MAA schemes would transfer the bulk of the reserve
fund to the EPI scheme. The amount is so calculated as to secure
benefits promised when contributions were paid. In other words,
it is roughly the reserve based on the unit credit method without
revaluing pensionable remunerations.
(iii) Benefits corresponding to the period before the merger would be
financed by the reserve fund transferred from each of the three
MAA schemes, the national subsidy, and contributions paid by
the active participants of JR, JT, and NTT Companies.27 If these
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financial resources prove insufficient to finance the benefits, then
the difference would be spread to all the schemes for employees.
A conceptual chart for the financial framework mentioned earlier appears
in Figure 11-3. In the case of the MAA for JR Employees, the transferred
reserve fund, the national subsidy, and the contributions were not enough
Benefit amount

Contributions of
JR or JT employees

Portion of benefits financed by the
assistance from all the remaining
schemes for employees

Portion of benefits
financed by
contributions of all
the active
participants of the
EPI scheme

Portion of benefits financed by
the contributions of JR or JT employees

To reserve
fund based
on unit credit
financing
method
To Basic
Pension
Sub-account

Portion of benefits financed
by
the transferred reserve fund
Portion of benefits financed by
national subsidy (transitional provisions)
Benefits
corresponding
to the period
before the
merger

Portion of benefits
financed by the
reserve fund based
on the unit credit
financing method

Benefits
corresponding to
the period
after the merger
1 April 1997

Figure 11-3 Merging the Mutual Aid Associations (MAAs) for Japan Railway Company (JR), Salt and Tobacco Monopoly Enterprise (JT), and Nippon Telegraph and
Telecommunications Enterprise (NTT) employees with the Employees’ Pension
Insurance (EPI) scheme. Source: 2004 Actuarial Report of the EPI scheme and the
NP scheme by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (Government of Japan
2005).
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to pay the benefits, so the difference has been supported by the remaining
schemes for employees. In the case of the MAA for JT Employees, the
situation was the same and the shortfall of the benefit expenditure was
covered by the other schemes. In the case of the MAA for NTT Employees,
these financial resources were enough to pay the benefits so there have
been no further transfers from the remaining schemes for employees.
Substantial reserves were transferred to the EPI scheme from each of the
three MAA schemes on the merger. The actual reserve fund that the MAA
for JR Employees held at the time of the merger was only JPY 0.3 trillion
while the amount to be transferred was JPY 1.2 trillion; the clearing house
corporation set up by the government to handle long-term debts when
the JR Company was privatized is paying the difference over a 20-year
installment period. The shortfall created by the merger of MAA schemes
for JR and JT Employees has been compensated for by the remaining
schemes for employees. The amount is based on financial projections, with
the leveled annual shortfall totalling about JPY 0.13 trillion (in terms of the
FY 2005 value); this is indexed to the rate of increase of yearly pensionable
remunerations including pensionable bonuses for active participants of
the schemes for employees. It is shared by the remaining schemes for
employees.28
The Scheme for Agricultural, Fishery, and Forestry Cooperative Employees. In late 1990s, the Agricultural Cooperatives were forced to restructure their businesses due to globalization and deregulation. The number
of active participants in the MAA for Agricultural, Fishery, and Forestry
Cooperative Employees decreased from 511,000 in FY 1994 to 475,000 in
FY 1999. Ultimately the MAA was merged with the EPI scheme in 2002,
with a financial framework for the merger similar to that stipulated for the
JR, JT, and NTT Employees schemes. The MAA for Agricultural, Fishery
and Forestry Cooperative Employees transferred the reserve fund of JPY
1.6 trillion to the EPI scheme. The transferred reserve fund, the national
subsidy, and contributions from active employees of the cooperatives were
enough to finance the benefits corresponding to the period before the
merger, so there was no need for support from the remaining schemes for
employees.
In all, then, the 10 schemes that existed in the 1960s have been merged
down to five with the NP scheme extending its coverage to the whole
nation.

Ongoing merger efforts
In early 2001, the Cabinet published a decision stating that measures
should be adopted to enhance the financial basis of employees’ schemes
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and urged unification discussions should continue after the MAA for Agricultural, Fishery and Forestry Cooperative Employees was merged with the
EPI scheme.29 This Cabinet Decision also urged the MAA for Government
Employees and the MAA for Local Government Employees to unify their
financial bases which actually occurred in 2004; contribution rates are
equalized as of 2009.30 National pension reform occurred in 2004 with
the introduction of an automatic balancing mechanism through modified
indexation (Sakamoto 2005). The indexation is to be applied to all the
schemes.
The political debate over pension mergers continued throughout 2004,
in which the largest opposition party, the Democratic Party, campaigned
on the pledge of a single social security pension scheme.31 Shortly after the
landslide victory of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party in the Lower House
election in September 2005,32 the government set up a formal meeting
of the ministries33 charged with the schemes to resolve problems of unification. The group’s 2005 report referred to differences in contribution
rates and benefit provisions, as well as questions about how to manage the
pooled MAA reserve funds. They also noted the question of what to do
with the occupational addition, how to treat benefits of national or local
government employees corresponding to the period before the merger of
the superannuation system with the mutual aid associations, etc. Around
the same time, the government parties’ Pension Reform Council issued
a report recommending the equalization of contribution rate, abolishing
different benefit provisions, abolishing the occupational addition, etc. Following this, a Cabinet Decision of 2006 was issued and a bill submitted to
the Diet in April 2007, with these ideas. The bill went further to stipulate
that the EPI scheme should be extended to national and local government
employees as well as private school employees, and it also proposed all MAA
schemes be restructured as branches of the EPI scheme.

Twenty-first century unification efforts
In early 2007, the government submitted to the Diet a new reform bill
to unify the schemes for employees into a single scheme. It had several
elements, first and foremost among them the extension of EPI coverage to
national and local government employees and private school employees.
Benefit provisions for future accruals are to be made uniform, including
no further accrual of occupational additions after 2010.34 Past benefits
corresponding to the period before October 1959 must be cut by 27
percent to reduce the tax burden by reducing past service cost.35 (There
are alleviating provisions that the total benefit cut should not exceed 10
percent and that the annual benefit amount after the reduction should not
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Table 11-1 Contribution programs for each scheme for employees
FY

Just before the
2004 actuarial
valuation
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
↓
2017
2018
↓
2027

MAA for
Government
Employees

MAA for Local MAA for Private (%)
Government School Employees
EPI
Employees
Scheme

14.38

13.03

10.46

13.58

14.509
14.638
14.767
14.896
15.025

13.384
13.738
14.092
14.446
14.800

10.46(∗ )
10.814
11.168
11.522
11.876
12.230
12.584
↓

13.934
14.288
14.642
14.996
15.350
15.704
16.058
↓
18.3

15.154
15.508
↓
18.3

18.3

Note: ∗ The initial date of the latest actuarial valuation of the MAA for Private School
Employees was April 1, 2005.
Source: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (Government of Japan 2005).

go below JPY 2.5 million.) Contribution rates are also to be made equal
to those of the EPI scheme (with a transitional period) and future MAA
contribution rates will be raised in step with EPI (namely by 0.354% every
year); see Table 11-1.
Under the new structure, the MAAs are to become administrative
branches of the EPI scheme, keeping records, collecting contributions,
awarding benefits, paying benefits with partial financial interchange among
the EPI sub-account and the MAA branches, managing and investing the
reserve funds, etc. Active participants in the new scheme will be classified into four groups: active participants whose contributions will be collected by the Pension Sub-account of the Social Insurance Special Account;
active participants whose contributions are to be collected by the MAA
for Government Employees; active participants whose contributions are
to be collected by the MAA for Local Government Employees; and active
participants whose contributions are to be collected by the MAA for Private
School Employees.
The MAA schemes will manage and invest the portion of their reserve
funds; it is unclear whether the segregation will be notional or actual.36
Given the current size of the reserve funds of the MAA schemes, there
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will certainly remain some reserve funds though the bill does not clarify
how these remaining reserve funds will be utilized.37 Investment principles
for these funds will be determined by the Minister of Health, Labour and
Welfare in consultation with other ministries, and every year the funds’
investment performance will be published.
Assuming that the bill is adopted, what can be forecast for future government employee benefits? They will have the old-age basic pension
benefit and the old-age EPI benefit, as well as new retirement benefits
from newly-established occupational pension schemes that have yet to be
established. They may also have retirement lump-sum benefits and personal
savings including personal annuities. As yet, all the provisions of the tobe-established occupational pension scheme are not known, but it appears
that its payment combined with employer-provided lump-sum benefits must
not exceed the average retirement benefits of private companies with at
least 50 employees. A 2006 survey found that the private benefit amount
expressed as a lump-sum was JPY 29.8 million, while that which had been
paid to government employees was JPY 29.6 million including the occupational addition of the MAA for Government Employees. If the portion
paid by employees themselves was included, the private sector average
was JPY 30.4 million while that of government employees was JPY 31.8
million. Overall the new occupational pension scheme will likely pay lower
benefits than before.38 It should also be noted that the new occupational
pension scheme will be defined benefit; the fact that some government
employees access to insider information precludes a defined contribution
plan.
In 2007, political turmoil stymied the prospects for pension unification
since the government party lost its majority in the Upper House. In addition, the Democratic Party has said it will not agree to the bill’s passage39
unless the whole nation is covered, including the self-employed. Adding
to the debate was the recent revelation of the existence of 50 million
unidentified records of the NP and the EPI schemes kept by the Social
Insurance Agency, giving rise to massive public anxiety. Hence the reform
agenda will continue to be debated for some time.

Conclusion
Looking back on efforts to unify the Japanese social security pension
schemes, several factors enabled the process to proceed as far as it has.
First, some schemes encountered financial difficulties due to changes in
industrial structure. Second, the 1985 reform made benefit formulas the
same which facilitated the later mergers. Third, strong political leadership
helped drive the bill to unify the schemes.40 Fourth, pension jealousy
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justified the claim that social security pension benefits should be equalized
without exceptions.
There remain some outstanding matters to clarify in future years. For
instance in some cases, the former insurers remain as administrative
branches of the EPI scheme. Also the financial interchange is only partial.
Nevertheless, progress has been made to strengthen the financial basis of
the social security pension benefits and make the benefits and contributions equitable.

Notes
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

The current Japanese social security pension provisions include two layers. The
first layer is the National Pension (NP) scheme which covers the whole nation
with a flat-rate basic pension benefit. Active participants in the NP scheme are
classified into three categories: (a) the self-employed, farmers, the unemployed,
etc; (b) the active employees below age 70; and (c ) non-working dependent
spouses. The second layer is for employees, and there are four schemes in this
second layer: (a) the Employees’ Pension Insurance (EPI) scheme for private
employees, (b) the Mutual Aid Association (MAA) for government employees,
(c ) the MAA for local government employees, and (d) the MAA for private
school employees. Both the EPI and the MAA schemes provide earnings-related
benefits.
Contribution rates as of April 2008 are 14.996 percent for the EPI scheme, 14.896
percent for the MAA for government employees, 14.446 percent for the MAA for
local government employees, and 11.876 percent for the MAA for private school
employees.
For an outline of the current framework of Japanese social security pensions
see Sakamoto (2007). Additional information is available from Government of
Japan (1957, 1984, 1994, 1996, 2001, 2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c) and Yoshiwara
(1987, 2004).
Government employees were ranked. Their ranks were raised when they got
promotions. Civil servants were those whose ranks were above or equal to a
certain rank.
A man named Toshinaga Kawaji studied the French police system in Paris and
contributed to constructing the modern police system in Japan in 1870s. He
concluded that civil servants can be thought of as commodities bought by taxes
paid for by the general public.
In 1907, the mutual aid association for employees of the Imperial Railway Agency
was introduced.
Some people deemed to be public employees were promoted to be civil servants.
However, if both of their periods of service as public employees and as civil
servants did not satisfy the qualifying period for the mutual aid association and
for the superannuation system, they could receive only lump-sum payments and
not pensions from either of them. There was no portability permitted between
the superannuation and the mutual aid association system.
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8

9

10
11

12

13

14

15
16

17
18

19

20

21

Around this time, in 1950, Robert Myers, former Deputy-Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration of the US government, came to Japan at the invitation of the General Headquarters and gave advice to the Japanese government
about the reconstruction of the civil service pension schemes.
The Japanese national railway was privatized in 1987 and became the Japan
Railway Company. The Salt and Tobacco Monopoly Enterprise was privatized
in 1985 and became the Japan Tobacco Company. The Nippon Telegraph and
Telecommunications Enterprise was privatized in 1985 and became the Nippon
Telegraph and Telecommunication Company. The names of the three public
enterprise employees’ mutual aid associations are derived from those companies’
names after privatization.
The mutual aid associations provided health insurance as well.
The level contribution method is the financing method in which the contribution rates are set to be level throughout the period of equilibrium. By static we
mean that we do not take account of the salary increase nor price increase in the
future when we calculate the level contribution rate.
Government employees from the period prior to October 1959 are very old and
form a closed group, so the past service cost is decreasing. It was JPY 0.47 trillion
out of the total expenditure of JPY 2.2 trillion in FY 2005.
Ten percent of the contribution amount was subsidized by the government
and the rest was shared equally by the employees and the employer (the government). This was changed later; currently the national subsidy is given by a
fixed percentage of particular expenditure and the contributions themselves are
shared equally by employees and the employer (the government).
In Japan, government employees are forbidden to strike and are prohibited to
hold stock.
In 1973, benefit indexation was introduced in the EPI scheme.
Past service costs of the local government employee plan amounted to JPY 1.2
trillion out of the total expenditure of 5.6 trillion in FY 2005.
The exception was the service sector in the secondary classification of industry.
Some universities decided not to participate in the MAA for Private School
Employees but were covered by the EPI scheme, because they judged that their
health insurance contributions would be larger if they had joined the MAA for
Private School Employees. Most of the MAA schemes provided health insurance
benefits for the participants as well.
Unlike other MAA schemes, the MAA for Agricultural, Fishery, and Forestry
Cooperative Employees did not provide participants with health insurance benefits. Instead, these employees were covered by a health insurance society that
was a contracted-out insurer of the Health Insurance scheme provided by the
government.
The 1973 oil crisis caused daily goods prices to soar by 11.7 percent in 1973, 23.2
percent in 1974, and 11.7 percent in 1975. These inflation rates were reflected
in the benefit amount according to the automatic indexation provision.
In the 1970s, the company was still the Japan National Railway Company so it
would be more accurate to denote it by the MAA for JNR Employees. However we denote it here by the MAA for JR Employees since later in 1987 the
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22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

JNR Company was privatized and became the Japan Railway Company as noted
previously.
In order to finance the cost of paying the basic pension benefits, the Basic
Pension Sub-account of the National Pension Special Account collects the designated amount of money from all the schemes, namely the EPI scheme, the
MAA for Government Employees, the MAA for Local Government Employees,
the MAA for Private School Employees, and the National Pension Sub-account
of the National Pension Special Account. The self-employed, farmers, and such
pay contributions to the National Pension Sub-account of the National Pension
Scheme. The cost of paying the basic pension benefits is shared by these schemes
in proportion to the number of active participants age 20–59 plus the number of
dependent spouses age 20–59.
If the number of covered years was fewer than 20, then it was 10 percent, and if
it was less than 1, then there was no occupational addition.
Strictly speaking, the pension provisions of the Seamen’s Insurance were merged
with the EPI scheme, and the rest of the provisions like health insurance and
work injury provisions were left in the Seamen’s Insurance.
The establishment of the 1994 working group was also based on the Cabinet
Decision of February 1984.
It goes without saying that, every time they obtained financial help from other
schemes, the MAA schemes for JR and JT Employees sought to reduce benefit
costs including abolishing the occupational addition of the newly awarded and
paying higher contributions than other active participants even after the merger.
Strictly speaking, they are the contributions left after the amount to be transferred to the Basic Pension Sub-account and the amount corresponding to the
increased accrued liabilities during the year measured in the unit credit cost
method are deducted. The contributions left are split into two parts to finance
the benefits corresponding to the period before and after the merger in proportion to the benefit amount of each part.
Setting each scheme’s share is rather complicated. To briefly outline the process,
half of the level amount is shared in proportion to the total amount of the yearly
pensionable remunerations including pensionable bonuses of each scheme. The
remaining half is shared taking account of the cost rate of each scheme. The
share is only on the schemes whose cost rates are not more than the cost rate of
the EPI scheme. It of course includes the EPI scheme. The share is then decided
in proportion both to the total amount of yearly pensionable remunerations
including pensionable bonuses and to the difference of the cost rate of the
scheme and that of the EPI scheme with some relief for the EPI scheme.
This was a continuation of the Cabinet Decision of February 1984. In fact, in
March 1996, just before the bill to merge the three MAAs for former Public
Enterprise (JR, JT, and NTT) Employees was submitted to the Diet, the Cabinet
had also announced a decision to continue the effort to unify the framework
of social security pension schemes for employees before system maturity in the
twenty-first century. Both Cabinet Decisions, in this way, confirmed the direction
of the Cabinet Decision of February 1984 and urged future governments to
complete the policy implementation.
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30

31

32

33

34

35

Each of the two MAAs still remains as an independent insurer while the unification of the financial bases is carried out through financial interchange. The
basic idea of this financial interchange is that the insurer with the lower cost
rate (excluding the expenditure for basic pensions) gives cash to the insurer
with the higher cost rate. Since this neglects the investment return, if one of
the insurer becomes short of cash to pay benefits (including the expenditure for
basic pensions), the other gives cash to the one from its surplus.
During the 2004 Diet deliberations, the Democratic Party, which is the largest
opposition party, tried to prevent the bill from passing the Diet by disclosing
bribes by high-ranking officials of the Social Insurance Agency and by attacking
several ministers who they said had not paid NP contributions for certain periods.
The information was apparently provided by those supportive of the Democratic
Party within the Social Insurance Agency. In the 2004 Upper House Election,
the government parties lost only one seat which was sufficient to arouse anger
against Social Insurance Agency staff. Ultimately the government decided to
abolish the Social Insurance Agency and split it into two parts, the National
Health Insurance Federation in charge of health insurance (mainly for small
companies), and the Japan Pension Organization which is slated to take over
the EPI and NP schemes. Interestingly, the new staffs will not be government
employees. During this restructuring process, in 2007 it was revealed there were
as many as 50 million unidentified records from both the EPI and NP schemes
stored in the Social Insurance Agency, a revelation that apparently contributed
to eventual fall of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.
This time the Prime Minister dissolved the Lower House when the bill to privatize
Japan Post was rejected in the Upper House.
They are the Cabinet Secretariat; the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications; the Ministry of Finance; the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports,
Science and Technology; and the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.
There are other small differences. For example, under the MAA schemes, survivors’ benefits can be taken over by the parents of the deceased if they are alive
when the children of the deceased reach the age of 18. Under the EPI scheme,
it cannot be taken over. This case is to be treated in the same way as the EPI
provisions. Another example is the income testing for the old-age beneficiaries
actively covered by other schemes. If an old-age EPI beneficiary is actively covered
by an MAA scheme, his/her old-age EPI benefit is not subject to income-testing
while, if a retirement MAA beneficiary is actively covered by the EPI or another
MAA scheme, his/her retirement MAA benefit is subject to income-testing. This
case is, roughly speaking, to be treated in the same way as the MAA provisions.
This sort of equalization is to be introduced.
When the new MAA for Government Employees was introduced in October 1959,
the contribution rate was 8.8 shared equally between employer and employees,
so the government employees’ share was 4.4 percent. For the superannuation
system, on the other hand, the civil servants had paid 2 percent of their salary as
a token of gratitude to the country. This was interpreted as having been short of
the full contribution rate by 2.4 percent during the time of the superannuation
system. Consequently it was decided to cut the benefits by 2.4/8.8 or roughly 27
percent.

20:23

978–0–19–957334–9

Mitchell-Main-drv

Mitchell

(Typeset by SPi, Chennai)

185 of 343

July 21, 2009

11 / Unifying Pension Schemes in Japan 185
36

37

38

39

40

The reform bill only states the segregation and leaves the details to regulations
that will be published when the bill passes the Diet.
There are several options as to how to share the reserve fund. One approach
would be to follow the path selected when the MAA for JR Employees was merged
with the EPI scheme, but this was not adopted in this case since the JR scheme was
on the verge of financial collapse while the MAAs for Government Employees,
Local Government Employees, and Private School Employees are not.
Government employees are not to be allowed to register in the DC scheme,
probably because the new occupational pension scheme is to be introduced.
The government parties control over two-thirds of the Lower House, so they can
utilize the provision that the bill passes the Diet as long as it gains approval
of more than two thirds of the whole seats in the Lower House even after the
Upper House denies the bill. This provision was utilized to force passage of a
bill providing fuel by the Self Defence Forces in the Indian Ocean to war vessels
of allied nations engaged in the Afghanistan war. It is believed that too-frequent
utilization of this provision will give the government parties a bad image causing
them to lose elections, so they are understandably cautious when implementing
the provision.
It is not clear why the then-Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi ordered the Chief
Cabinet Secretary to come up with the bill to unify the social security pension
schemes for employees. One apparent motivation might have been that in 2004,
the Democratic Party refused to deliberate the bill, insisting that the true reform
was the unification of all schemes and the coverage of both employees and the
self-employed under a single scheme. Yet the Party’s insistence seemed unrealistic relating especially to the treatment of the self-employed. Mr. Koizumi might
have thought that he could win the next election by unifying employee schemes
and curtailing government employee prestige.
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